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Willford: Probate Law

PROBATE LAW
I.

SUPREME COURT HOLDS REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST INVALID

AS ILLUSORY AND SUBJECT TO THE ELECTIVE SHARE OF A
SURVIVING SPOUSE

In Seifert v. Southern National Bank' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that, when "a spouse seeks to avoid payment of the elective
share by creating a trust over which he or she exercises substantial
control, the trust may be declared invalid as illusory, and the trust assets
will be included in the decedent's estate for calculation of the elective
share." 2 The court's broad language in striking the revocable inter vivos
trust in this case created significant questions about the general validity
of such trust. However, the South Carolina General Assembly responded
to limit the Seifert holding to trusts designed to avoid a spouse's elective
share. 3

Decedent, Harry Seifert, was married to Agnes Seifert for ten years.
Prior to his death, Mr. Seifert created a revocable inter vivos trust in
favor of his daughters from a previous marriage, but he retained the
income benefits of the trust for his lifetime. At the time of Mr. Seifert's
death, the value of the trust was approximately $800,000, and his gross
estate, including the trust, totaled approximately $1,200,000. Under the
terms of the trust, upon Mr. Seifert's death, $150,000 was carved from
the trust and placed into a separate trust for the benefit of the widow.4
Mrs. Seifert claimed that the revocable inter vivos trust was part of
her husband's estate, therefore subject to her statutory elective share. 5
Mr. Seifert's daughters, the beneficiaries of the trust, sought to exclude

1. 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E.2d 337 (1991).
2. Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (footnote omitted).
3. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
4. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 354-55, 409 S.E.2d at 338. This new trust was called the
"Agnes T. Seifert Trust." Mrs. Seifert received a life estate in the income of this
trust, but could invade its principal only for medical reasons. Mr. Seifert's daughters
retained the remainder interest in the new trust. Under the decedent's will, Mrs.
Seifert also received a one-half life interest in the marital home, and the residue of
the estate was transferred to the main trust. Id.
5. Id. South Carolina's elective share statute provides: "[]f a married person
domiciled in this State dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an
elective share of one-third of the decedent's probate estate, as computed under § 622-202." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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the trust assets from their father's estate pursuant to section 62-2-202 of
the South Carolina Probate Code (SCPC). 6
The supreme court, relying on Moore v. Jones and Newman v.
Dore,' found the trust invalid as illusory because the decedent retained
extensive control over the trust during his life. 9 The court expressly
rejected the respondents' interpretation of section 62-2-201 of the
SCPC. 10 The respondents argued that the 1987 amendments to these
sections indicated the legislature's intention to exclude trusts and other
nonprobate assets from the estate by which the elective share is calculated." However, the court stated that these sections did not specifically
preclude the trust from being included in the decedent's estate.1 2 The
court further noted that very little difference exists between an illusory
trust and an otherwise valid trust that fails; in either case, the trust assets
revert to the settlor's estate and become subject to the elective share. 3

6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). This section defined
the "probate estate" to include "the decedent's property passing under the decedent's
will plus the decedent's property passing by intestacy, reduced by funeral and
administration expenses and enforceable claims." Id. Prior to its amendment in 1987,
section 62-2-202 provided: "Estate means the estate reduced by funeral and
administration expenses and enforceable claims." S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law.
Co-op. 1987) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991)). The reporter's comments to the prior section stated:
This section rejects the "augmented estate" concept promulgated by
the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code as unnecessarily complex. The
spouse's protection relates to all real and personal assets owned by the
decedent at death but does not take into account the use of various will
substitutes which permit an owner to transfer ownership at his death
without use of a will. Judicialdoctrinesidentifying certain transfersto be
"illusory" or to be in "fraud"of the spouse's sharehave evolved in some
jurisdictionsto offset the problems caused by will substitutes.
Id. § 62-2-202 cmts. (emphasis added).
7. 261 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (finding an otherwise valid trust
ineffective only insofar as it impaired surviving spouse's statutory rights).
8. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937) (applying illusory-transfer test whereby inter vivos
trust is void if settlor failed to divest himself of ownership of property).
9. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 355-56, 409 S.E.2d at 338 (noting that the trust was
completely revocable, that the trust agreement described the trustee's role as merely
custodial, and that the terms of trust did not allow the trustee to sell, invest, or
reinvest any of the assets during Mr. Seifert's lifetime, unless he gave written notice
or was incompetent).
10. Id. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
11. See supra note 6.
12. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339.
13. Id.
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The court also refused to accept the respondents' contention that the
South Carolina General Assembly's rejection of the Uniform Probate
Code's "augmented estate" option 4 implicitly prohibited the invalidation of the trust.' 5 The court reasoned that the right to receive the
elective share is substantial because section 62-2-204 of the SCPC
requires any waiver of the elective share to be in writing. 16 Therefore,
the legislature did not intend to allow that right to be circumvented in
this manner. 7 The court concluded that, because nothing in the SCPC
expressly prohibits the proceeds of an invalid or illusory trust from being
included in the probate estate, the proceeds of the decedent's trust should
be included in his estate and subject to the elective share.'"
Seifert illustrates the underlying public policy conflict between the
desire to protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance and the settlor's
right to alienate freely his property during his lifetime. 9 Although the
court held that the trust was illusory and subject to the elective share, the
legislative history of the statute and the common law of South Carolina
suggest that the trust was a valid nonprobate asset, not subject to the
elective share. The breadth of the Seifert court's decision left unanswered
many questions concerning the viability of revocable trusts.
In 1984 the South Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that "[tihe
right to deal with one's real property without the prior consent and
cooperation of one's spouse is substantial and valuable." 2" The court
held that the South Carolina common-law right of dower, which
protected only widows from disinheritance, was unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause. 2' After this decision, wives in South
Carolina had no protection from disinheritance until the elective share
statute of the SCPC22 became effective on July 1, 1987.'

14. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 75 (1990); see also S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-202 cmts. (Law. Co-op. 1987) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)).
15. Seifert, 305 S.C. at 356, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (noting that the augmented estate
"is an elaborate system of incorporating various non-probate assets into the estate").
16. Id. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Coop. 1987)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Moore v. Jones, 261 S.E.2d 289, 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing
these competing policies).
20. Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 519, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1984).
21. Id. The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No State shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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As originally enacted, the SCPC included a broadly defined estate
as the basis of calculating the elective share.24 This broad definition of
"estate" could have subjected nonprobate assets to the elective share
despite the reporter's comments to this section. The General Assembly
amended sections 62-2-201 and 62-2-202 to provide that the elective
share could be charged only against the "probate estate," which the
legislature defined as those assets passing by will or intestacy, less
funeral and administration expenses and enforceable claims- 5 The court
offered no explanation for these amendments to the SCPC, but summarily
noted that the legislature's rejection of the augmented estate concept did
not "prohibit invalidation of [an] inter vivos trust. "26 The only realistic
explanation for the amendments and the rejection of the augmented estate
concept is that the legislature intended to prohibit nonprobate assets, such
as revocable inter vivos trusts, from inclusion in elective share calculations. The court's failure to address the legislative intent of the amendments to the SCPC may render the amendments meaningless. 27
Furthermore, the SCPC suggests that the trust should have been
upheld as valid and not subject to the elective share. The judiciary must
apply the terms of a statute according to their literal meaning when the
terms are clear and unambiguous. 28 The language of the amended

23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-100(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (establishing July

1, 1987 as the effective date of the SCPC unless otherwise provided).
24. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (stating that "the
surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third of the
decedent's estate, as computed under § 62-2-202") (emphasis added) (superseded);

S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (defining "estate" for purposes of
§ 62-2-201 as "the estate reduced by funeral and administration expenses and
enforceable claims") (superseded); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-201(11) (Law. Co-op.
1987) (defining "estate" to include generally "the property of the decedent, trust, or
other person whose affairs are subject to this Code as originally constituted and as
it exists from time to time during administration").
25. See supra note 6.
26. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 357, 409 S.E.2d 337, 339
(1991).
27. Cf. Crescent:Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 129 S.C. 480, 49394, 124 S.E. 761, 765 (1924) (stating that "a statute must receive such construction
as will make all of its parts harmonize with each other and render them consistent
with its general scope and object"). Notably, the Seifert court held that "the trust
assets will be included in the decedent's estate," instead of using the term "probate
estate." Seifert, 305 S.C. at 357, 409 S.E.2d at 339 (emphasis added).
28. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 302 S.C. 140, 394
S.E.2d 315 (1990); accordSouth Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
Dickinson, 288 S.C. 189, 191, 341 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1986) (noting that the supreme
court has "'no right to legislate the provision from the statute or to modify its
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/16
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statutes distinguishes probate assets from nonprobate assets; only probate
assets, those passing by will or intestacy, are included in computing the
elective share.29 Moreover, the SCPC recognizes the validity of a
revocable inter vivos trust,30 and South Carolina case law has long
upheld a revocable trust as a valid nonprobate transfer. 3' Because the
assets of a valid revocable inter vivos trust are nonprobate assets, the
SCPC unambiguously prohibits those assets from inclusion in elective
share calculations. 32
The Seifert court's holding brings the validity of all revocable trusts
into question. The court held that a settlor's extensive control over a
revocable trust renders the trust invalid, but failed to limit its sweeping
language to actions involving elective share calculations. 33 This rationale ignores previous South Carolina decisions. In Citizens & Southern
National Bank v. Auman34 the court stated that "[c]ertainly, the creation
of a revocable trust indicated that the donor intended to retain ultimate
control of the estate., 35 The cases cited by the Seifert court in support
of its finding that the revocable trust was illusory did not involve statutes
that limited the elective share to probate assets. 36 Even those jurisdictions that have found revocable trusts illusory for elective share purposes
have upheld such trusts for all other purposes. 37 The Seifert court

application under the guise of judicial interpretation'") (quoting Davis v. Doe, 285
S.C. 538, 541, 331 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1985)).
29. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-2-201 and -202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-201(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987) (stating that a transfer
effective as a contract, gift, or trust is valid, although deemed nontestamentary); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-7-603(A)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (implicitly upholding
validity of revocable inter vivos trusts by preventing merger of legal and equitable
titles to property held in trust, unless the legal and equitable titles are identical).
31. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Auman, 259 S.C. 263, 191 S.E.2d 511
(1972) (construing terms of a revocable trust after donor's death); Peoples Nat'l Bank
v. Peden, 229 S.C. 167, 92 S.E.2d 163 (1956) (acknowledging power to revoke trust
when validly reserved by the trust document).
32. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (limiting the
elective share to decedent's "probate estate"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-202 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1991) (defining "probate estate").
33. Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 305 S.C. 353, 355-56, 409 S.E.2d 337, 338
(1991) (stating that "[i]n light of the evidence of Husband's extensive control over
the trust, we find that the trust is illusory and, thus, invalid").
34. 259 S.C. 263, 191 S.E.2d 511 (1972).
35. Id. at 267, 191 S.E.2d at 514.
36. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1937); Moore v. Jones, 261
S.E.2d 289, 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Moore, 261 S.E.2d at 292.
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ignored not only South Carolina case law and the legislative intent to
uphold revocable trusts, but also the trend of the modem authorities.38
In response to Seifert, the South Carolina General Assembly
amended the SCPC to ensure the general validity of revocable inter vivos
trusts.39 The legislature's corrective action should clarify the current
legal relationship between revocable inter vivos trusts and the elective
share and should restore predictability in the practice of estate planning.
This welcomed response to Seifert protects settlors' alienation rights
while protecting surviving spouses from disinheritance. Consequently, a
court may now declare an otherwise valid revocable inter vivos trust
illusory, but only for purposes of including trust assets in the testator's
probate estate for calculating the elective share.
Steven E. Williford

38. See generally 1A AUSTIN W. Scorr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 57.2, at 140 (4th ed. 1987) (noting that the trend "is to uphold an inter
vivos trust no matter how extensive may be the powers over the administration of the
trust reserved by the settlor"). Additionally, the court's emphasis on excessive
retention of control may lead to questions about the validity of other transfer
instruments. Cf In re Estate of Francis, 394 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1990) (refusing to
extend surviving spouse's rights to joint bank accounts with right of survivorship).
39. Act of June 23, 1992, § 3, 1992 S.C. Acts 475 (to be codified at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-7-112). This new section provides:
A revocable inter vivos trust may be created either by declaration of
trust or by a transfer of property and is not rendered invalid because the
trust creator retains substantial control over the trust including, but not
limited to, (1) a right of revocation, (2) substantial beneficial interests in
the trust, or (3) the power to control investments or reinvestments.
Nothing herein, however, shall prevent a finding that a revocable inter
vivos trust, enforceable for other purposes, is illusory for purposes of
determining a spouse's elective share rights under Section 62-2-201 et seq.

A finding that a revocable inter vivos trust is illusory and thus invalid for
purposes of determining a spouse's elective share rights under Section 622-201 et seq. shall not render that revocable inter vivos trust invalid, but
would allow inclusion of the trust assets as part of the probate estate of the
trust creator only for the purpose of calculating the elective share and
would make available the trust assets for satisfaction of the elective share
only to the extent necessary under Section 62-2-207.
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